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- .\" -*- mode: troff; coding: utf-8 -*-
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- .\" ========================================================================
- .\"
- .IX Title "CMS_DECRYPT 3ossl"
- .TH CMS_DECRYPT 3ossl 2025-01-17 3.4.0 OpenSSL
- .\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes
- .\" way too many mistakes in technical documents.
- .if n .ad l
- .nh
- .SH NAME
- CMS_decrypt, CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer,
- CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey, CMS_decrypt_set1_password
- \&\- decrypt content from a CMS envelopedData structure
- .SH SYNOPSIS
- .IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
- .Vb 1
- \& #include <openssl/cms.h>
- \&
- \& int CMS_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert,
- \& BIO *dcont, BIO *out, unsigned int flags);
- \& int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
- \& EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert, X509 *peer);
- \& int CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, EVP_PKEY *pk, X509 *cert);
- \& int CMS_decrypt_set1_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
- \& unsigned char *pass, ossl_ssize_t passlen);
- .Ve
- .SH DESCRIPTION
- .IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
- \&\fBCMS_decrypt()\fR extracts the decrypted content from a CMS EnvelopedData
- or AuthEnvelopedData structure.
- It uses \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey()\fR to decrypt the content
- with the recipient private key \fIpkey\fR if \fIpkey\fR is not NULL.
- In this case, the associated certificate is recommended to provide in \fIcert\fR \-
- see the NOTES below.
- \&\fIout\fR is a BIO to write the content to and
- \&\fIflags\fR is an optional set of flags.
- If \fIpkey\fR is NULL the function assumes that decryption was already done
- (e.g., using \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey()\fR or \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_password()\fR) and just
- provides the content unless \fIcert\fR, \fIdcont\fR, and \fIout\fR are NULL as well.
- The \fIdcont\fR parameter is used in the rare case where the encrypted content
- is detached. It will normally be set to NULL.
- .PP
- \&\fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer()\fR decrypts the CMS_ContentInfo structure \fIcms\fR
- using the private key \fIpkey\fR, the corresponding certificate \fIcert\fR, which is
- recommended but may be NULL, and the (optional) originator certificate \fIpeer\fR.
- On success, it also records in \fIcms\fR the decryption key \fIpkey\fR, and then
- should be followed by \f(CW\*(C`CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, dcont, out, flags)\*(C'\fR.
- This call deallocates any decryption key stored in \fIcms\fR.
- .PP
- \&\fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey()\fR is the same as
- \&\fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer()\fR with \fIpeer\fR being NULL.
- .PP
- \&\fBCMS_decrypt_set1_password()\fR decrypts the CMS_ContentInfo structure \fIcms\fR
- using the secret \fIpass\fR of length \fIpasslen\fR.
- On success, it also records in \fIcms\fR the decryption key used, and then
- should be followed by \f(CW\*(C`CMS_decrypt(cms, NULL, NULL, dcont, out, flags)\*(C'\fR.
- This call deallocates any decryption key stored in \fIcms\fR.
- .SH NOTES
- .IX Header "NOTES"
- Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is
- needed to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the CMS
- structure.
- .PP
- If \fIcert\fR is set to NULL all possible recipients are tried. This case however
- is problematic. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on
- PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or
- not. If no recipient succeeds then a random symmetric key is used to decrypt
- the content: this will typically output garbage and may (but is not guaranteed
- to) ultimately return a padding error only. If \fBCMS_decrypt()\fR just returned an
- error when all recipient encrypted keys failed to decrypt an attacker could
- use this in a timing attack. If the special flag \fBCMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT\fR is set
- then the above behaviour is modified and an error \fBis\fR returned if no
- recipient encrypted key can be decrypted \fBwithout\fR generating a random
- content encryption key. Applications should use this flag with
- \&\fBextreme caution\fR especially in automated gateways as it can leave them
- open to attack.
- .PP
- It is possible to determine the correct recipient key by other means (for
- example looking them up in a database) and setting them in the CMS structure
- in advance using the CMS utility functions such as \fBCMS_set1_pkey()\fR,
- or use \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_password()\fR if the recipient has a symmetric key.
- In these cases both \fIcert\fR and \fIpkey\fR should be set to NULL.
- .PP
- To process KEKRecipientInfo types \fBCMS_set1_key()\fR or \fBCMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key()\fR
- and \fBCMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt()\fR should be called before \fBCMS_decrypt()\fR and
- \&\fIcert\fR and \fIpkey\fR set to NULL.
- .PP
- The following flags can be passed in the \fIflags\fR parameter.
- .PP
- If the \fBCMS_TEXT\fR flag is set MIME headers for type \f(CW\*(C`text/plain\*(C'\fR are deleted
- from the content. If the content is not of type \f(CW\*(C`text/plain\*(C'\fR then an error is
- returned.
- .SH "RETURN VALUES"
- .IX Header "RETURN VALUES"
- \&\fBCMS_decrypt()\fR, \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer()\fR,
- \&\fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey()\fR, and \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_password()\fR
- return either 1 for success or 0 for failure.
- The error can be obtained from \fBERR_get_error\fR\|(3).
- .SH BUGS
- .IX Header "BUGS"
- The \fBset1_\fR part of these function names is misleading
- and should better read: \fBwith_\fR.
- .PP
- The lack of single pass processing and the need to hold all data in memory as
- mentioned in \fBCMS_verify()\fR also applies to \fBCMS_decrypt()\fR.
- .SH "SEE ALSO"
- .IX Header "SEE ALSO"
- \&\fBERR_get_error\fR\|(3), \fBCMS_encrypt\fR\|(3)
- .SH HISTORY
- .IX Header "HISTORY"
- \&\fBCMS_decrypt_set1_pkey_and_peer()\fR and \fBCMS_decrypt_set1_password()\fR
- were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
- .SH COPYRIGHT
- .IX Header "COPYRIGHT"
- Copyright 2008\-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- .PP
- Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
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